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7T oday individuals rarely purchase goods directly from the manufacturer. We buy daily essentials from high street 
shops and supermarkets, as well as via a variety of online 
retailers. Goods are now starting to pass through more 
elaborate supply and distribution chains, with the majority of 
transactions rarely being achieved without the involvement 
of other parties. The vertical relations which characterise 
these supply and distribution chains operate in various 
ways which could have a positive or a negative effect on the 
consumer, making it important for us to understand what 
these effects are. Moreover, the choice of how a supply and 
distribution chain is structured in a particular industry may tell 
us something about the industry itself and is hence worthy of 
further study. 
Among the various business formats observed in practice 
there are two common ones, a wholesale structure and an 
agency structure. Under the wholesale structure (Figure 1a), 
retailers buy from suppliers and resell to final consumers, 
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8e.g., florists buy roses at flower markets and resell them in 
store. It is the suppliers who first set wholesale prices and 
then retailers set retail prices. Under the agency structure 
(Figure 1b), suppliers set prices and retailers merely help 
make transactions happen. In return, retailers receive shares 
of revenue specified by themselves in the first place, e.g., 
under fixed price listings, eBay sets a “final value fee” rate and 
receives a fraction of sellers’ total revenues.2
Figure 1. The Wholesale Structure and the Agency 
Structure
  
a. The Wholesale Structure     b. The Agency Structure
While the wholesale structure remains the standard in 
the bricks-and-mortar environment, the agency structure is 
becoming increasingly predominant in online markets with 
giant online retailers such as Amazon marketplace, Apple, 
eBay, Google and various booking websites adopting it. 
Recent theoretical studies tend to examine the agency 
structure alongside the (in)famous e-book case.3 However, 
there is a lack of research 
providing a systematic 
analysis of the agency 
structure per se as well as 
detailed comparisons of 
the wholesale and agency 
structures, which constitute 
the basis of understanding 
the changes in vertical 
relations.
Elsewhere I have taken the 
initial steps towards this goal 
by comparing the outcomes 
under the two structures and 
examining firms’ preferences 
in relation to business 
format. Since competition 
intensifies as the goods and 
services available become 
more similar to each other, 
the degree of differentiation 
within each level of the 
vertically related market can also be translated to the degree 
of market power of firms in that level.4 It would then be 
interesting to see how the relative degrees of market power 
affect firms’ preferences over business format, and whether 
that explains the popularity of one structure in certain markets.
In a simple representative model, I characterize the vertical 
relation first by the wholesale structure and then by the 
agency structure.5 I find that retail prices are always lower 
under the agency structure, so it seems that agency pricing 
causes no per se harm. Was the Department of Justice then 
wrong to force publishers to move away from the agency 
structure for e-books despite the price rise when it was 
adopted? It is possible the price rise may plausibly have 
been driven by, among other factors, the Most Favoured 
Nation clauses adopted at the same time and which directly 
undermine the incentives for rival retailers to cut price.6
Regarding profitability, I find that suppliers always prefer 
the wholesale structure whereas retailers prefer the agency 
structure for a wider range of degrees of differentiation. This 
generally suggests that a vertically-related market would 
operate under the wholesale structure if suppliers possess 
relatively higher market power, and would operate under the 
agency structure if retailers possess relatively higher market 
power. Immediately, this explains why the agency structure 
is initiated by retailers in practice – suppliers never have the 
incentive to switch away from the wholesale structure. For 
large online retailers with strong network and negotiation 
power, their preferred business format may be part of the 
“take it or leave it offer” they have for suppliers where suppliers 
may be vulnerable and have no choice. For instance, it 
appears that it was Apple who persuaded publishers to adopt 
the agency structure.7 
Moreover, my findings suggest that the relative profitability 
of the alternative schemes for retailers is sensitive to the 
degree of product differentiation at the supplier level: as long 
as it is not too low retailers are better off under the agency 
structure. This is interesting because it contrasts with our 
conventional understanding of the relationships between firms’ 
profitability and degrees of 
differentiation at different 
levels of the market. Given 
that they do not collude, 
firms in general would 
benefit from high degrees of 
differentiation at their own 
level and low degrees of 
differentiation at the other 
level of the market, such that 
they can exercise market 
power. This is true under the 
wholesale structure but not 
under the agency structure, 
as I find that retailers under 
the agency structure actually 
benefit from high degrees of 
differentiation at the supplier 
level. That is, the two parties’ 
incentives are better aligned 
under the agency structure. 
In fact retailer profits, as 
well as industry profits, are maximized at the point of perfect 
differentiation at both levels of the supply and distribution 
chain characterized by the agency structure. That is, if 
degrees of differentiation at both layers of the market are high 
enough the agency structure is effectively a more efficient 
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business format. While competition authorities in general 
believe that competition benefits consumers the current study 
shows that, although firms engaging in the agency structure 
may have incentives that are better aligned, consumers can 
still benefit from lower prices compared to those under the 
wholesale structure, ceteris paribus. 
Unlike the traditional views on vertical relations where 
retailers are often considered to be perfectly competitive and 
possess little market power, the rise of the agency structure 
implies that retailers are in a strong position. Since suppliers 
are always better off under the wholesale structure and hence 
have no incentive to switch, retailers wanting to impose 
the agency contracts have to have relatively higher market 
power. As the degree of differentiation at the suppliers’ level 
increases, retailer profits increase given the condition that the 
agency structure is in place, though this condition becomes 
more difficult to satisfy. This further indicates the considerable 
network and bargaining power of some online retailers.
